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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 14-3207 
___________ 
 
IN RE:  KENNETH MITAN,  
                                                  Petitioner 
____________________________________ 
 
On a Petition for Writ of Mandamus from the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(Related to E.D. Pa. Crim. No. 2-08-cr-00760-001) 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Rule 21, Fed. R. App. P. 
July 24, 2014 
Before:  RENDELL, FISHER and GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit  Judges  
 
(Opinion filed: September 5, 2014) 
_________ 
 
OPINION 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Kenneth Mitan filed this petition for a writ of mandamus seeking an order compelling 
the District Judge presiding over his motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to recuse himself.  
We will deny the petition. 
 Mitan was convicted by a jury in 2009 of federal mail and wire fraud, and related  
offenses.  He was sentenced to 262 months in prison and restitution of more than 1.5 million 
dollars.  We affirmed the judgment and sentence.  United States v. Mitan, 499 F. App’x 187, 
188 (3d Cir. 2012).  In June 2014, Mitan filed a motion to vacate his sentence pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 2255.  He also filed a motion for the disqualification of the District Judge under 28 
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U.S.C. §§ 144 and 455, arguing primarily that:  (1) the judge would be unable to fairly assess 
claims in the § 2255 motion that accused the judge of misconduct and former counsel of 
ineffective assistance; and (2) the judge is biased due to reviewing phone calls in which Mitan 
criticized him.  A few days after the motion was filed, the District Judge summarily denied it.  
Mitan then filed the instant petition for a writ of mandamus. 
 We have jurisdiction under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), and may consider 
Mitan’s arguments that recusal is warranted under 28 U.S.C. § 455 via mandamus review.1  
See In re Kensington Int’l Ltd., 353 F.3d 211, 219 (3d Cir. 2003).  We will grant relief only if 
the District Judge’s decision is tantamount to an abuse of discretion.  In re Kensington Int’l 
Ltd., 368 F.3d 289, 301 & n.12 (3d Cir. 2004).  “When the need for a writ of mandamus is 
determined by this court to be ‘clear and indisputable,’ a district judge’s decision not to recuse 
himself or herself necessarily also will have been an abuse of discretion or a clear legal error.”  
Alexander v. Primerica Holdings, 10 F.3d 155, 163 n.9 (3d Cir. 1993).  
 Mitan contends that recusal is warranted under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), (b)(1), and 
(b)(5)(iv).  Recusal is required under subsection (a) when a judge’s “impartiality might 
reasonably be questioned.”  28 U.S.C. § 455(a).  The test for such recusal is whether a 
reasonable person who is aware of all of the facts might reasonably question a judge’s 
impartiality.  In re Kensington Int’l Ltd., 368 F.3d at 302.  Section 455(b) sets forth specific 
circumstances for recusal, including:  (1) where a judge has personal bias concerning a party or 
                                              
1
 Mitan does not seek review of the District Judge’s refusal to recuse himself pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 144, which is not available via mandamus.  See In re Sch. Asbestos Litig., 977 F.2d 
764, 775-76 (3d Cir. 1992).   
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personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts; and (2) where a judge knows he is likely to 
be a material witness in the proceeding.  28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1), (b)(5)(iv). 
 Mitan argues that the District Judge cannot impartially decide the claims in his § 2255 
motion that accuse the judge of committing misconduct during the underlying criminal trial.  
The first accusation is that the judge improperly held an ex parte hearing with the prosecution 
in which Mitan was falsely accused of fabricating evidence.  Three pages of transcript confirm 
that the ex parte hearing occurred, but they do not provide much context for assessing this 
basis for recusal.  By way of background, Mitan proceeded pro se for a period of time in the 
District Court, including most of the time he spent in pretrial detention.  Mitan, 499 F. App’x 
at 189.  As part of an investigation into whether Mitan was obstructing justice by intimidating 
witnesses, the government reviewed his calls, but employed a procedure to screen out 
privileged communications.  Id. at 189-90.  Sometime later, the government abandoned the 
screening procedure.  Id. at 190.  Mitan moved to dismiss the indictment when he learned that 
the government was monitoring all of his calls.  Id.  Although the District Judge denied the 
motion because the calls did not reveal defense strategy, he expressed displeasure and serious 
concerns with the government’s actions.  Id. at 191.  It appears that the ex parte hearing Mitan 
now complains of occurred sometime after Mitan moved to dismiss the indictment.  The 
government approached the judge because they planned to follow up on leads regarding 
evidence fabrication, but were aware of the “sensitivities about our ongoing obstruction of 
justice investigation.”  The transcript provided by Mitan shows that the hearing was brief and 
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that the District Judge stated that he had nothing to say about the investigation, but warned the 
government not to monitor Mitan’s calls from prison. 
 Ex parte communications are strongly disfavored, see In re Kensington Int’l, Ltd., 368 
F.3d at 309-10, but we do not believe recusal is mandated on that basis here.  The ex parte 
hearing in this case arose from concern about the government’s previous investigative 
practices.  It appears that Mitan was not present because he was a target of the new avenue of 
investigation.  Moreover, the transcript reveals no basis upon which to question the judge’s 
impartiality:  he expressed no opinion about the investigation or Mitan, and he warned the 
government to be careful of Mitan’s rights.2  In this context, the brief ex parte hearing appears 
to have been necessitated by a procedural concern that could not be revealed to the defense.  It 
does not appear to have been an impermissible forum for one-sided advocacy regarding the 
merits of the criminal case.  See In re Sch. Asbestos Litig., 977 F. 2d at 789 (noting that ex 
parte communications are sometimes “tolerated of necessity”).  Therefore, Mitan has failed to 
show misconduct sufficient to raise a question about the District Judge’s ability to impartially 
decide the § 2255 claim, or any basis for perceived or actual bias against Mitan arising from 
the incident.
3
 
                                              
2
 One problem with ex parte communications is that they often are not recorded, In re 
Kensington, 368 F.3d at 309, but that is not a concern in this case. 
  
3
 To the extent that Mitan implies that the District Judge formed an opinion of him based on 
the accusation of evidence fabrication, we note that there is no expression of such opinion.  
Furthermore, Mitan was tried by a jury and was not charged with, or convicted of, evidence 
fabrication. 
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 Mitan also claims that the District Judge committed misconduct by inviting a judge 
from this Court to attend jury selection.  He concedes, however, that he has no proof of this.  
Recusal is not required on the basis of “unsupported, irrational, or highly tenuous speculation.”  
In re United States, 666 F.2d 690, 694 (1st Cir. 1981).  He next asserts that his case was 
improperly “steered” toward the District Judge because the judge would be biased against 
white collar criminals due to his prior position as a United States Attorney.  However, Mitan 
concedes that he has no evidence of impropriety to support his allegations.  Moreover, a judge 
is not required to recuse himself simply because he previously served as a United States 
Attorney.  See Edelstein v. Wilentz, 812 F.2d 128, 131 (3d Cir. 1987).
4
  Finally, we fail to see 
how Mitan’s allegation calls into question the District Judge’s ability to impartially decide the 
§ 2255 motion when the judge was not responsible for being assigned to Mitan’s case. 
 Mitan again raises the District Judge’s ability to impartially decide the § 2255 motion, 
this time by arguing that that the judge’s bias in favor of former counsel makes a fair 
assessment of ineffective assistance claims impossible.  The first basis for the alleged bias is 
that the counsel is a friend and former law clerk of the District Judge.  Mitan does not provide 
any support for, or detail regarding, the assertion that counsel is the judge’s friend.  Nor does 
he cite any legal authority for the proposition that a judge must recuse when a former law clerk 
is counsel for a party.  Although a law clerk enjoys a unique position and is often privy to a 
judge’s thoughts, it is not a general rule that a former law clerk may never practice before the 
                                              
4
 Mitan does not contend that the District Judge had any knowledge of the case due to his prior 
position. 
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judge for whom he or she clerked.  See Fredonia Broad. Corp., Inc. v. RCA Corp., 569 F.2d 
251, 256 (5th Cir. 1978).  As for the specific comments Mitan highlights from the record to 
support his allegation of bias, three are only brief remarks about counsel doing a good job that 
are not strong enough to amount to a “deep-seated favoritism . . . that would make fair 
judgment impossible.”  Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994).  The comments also 
appear to be based on counsel’s performance in the case, not an extrajudicial source.  Id. at 
550-51 (explaining the “extrajudicial source” doctrine).  Furthermore, the last example cited by 
Mitan – “I have only the highest compliments for [defense counsel]” – is followed by the judge 
complimenting the prosecution team’s efforts, exhibiting balanced praise for the work of 
counsel for both parties.  Mitan attempts to bolster his argument by claiming that the denial of 
certain motions demonstrates the District Judge’s bias.  However, a party’s displeasure with 
adverse legal rulings does not form a basis for recusal.  See Securacom Consulting, Inc. v. 
Securacom, Inc., 224 F.3d 273, 278 (3d Cir. 2000).  Moreover, Mitan has failed to explain how 
the denial of the pro se motions filed in the collateral proceedings are in any way related to his 
former counsel such that the alleged bias in her favor would come into play.   
 Finally, Mitan alleges that “it is possible” that the District Judge is biased against him 
because he listened to calls in which Mitan was critical of the judge.  This claim is based on the 
call-monitoring issue described earlier, and it fails for the following reasons.  First, Mitan has 
not explained what critical remarks he made in the calls reviewed by the District Judge, nor has 
he identified comments or actions by the District Judge that would suggest bias (or the 
appearance thereof) as a result of reviewing the calls.  Second, the source of the alleged bias is 
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not extra-judicial:  the District Judge reviewed recordings of five calls, which were identified 
by Mitan as prejudicial to mounting his defense, in the course of adjudicating Mitan’s motion 
to dismiss the indictment.  Mitan, 499 F. App’x at 191.  Even if the District Judge formed an 
opinion about Mitan from the calls, it would not automatically be a basis for disqualification 
because the opinion was “properly and necessarily acquired” in the course of the prior 
proceedings.  Litekey, 510 U.S. at 551.  The only way an opinion acquired from the 
proceedings could constitute a basis for recusal is if it evinced a “deep-seated antagonism” 
against Mitan, id. at 555, which has not been demonstrated in this case. 
 For these reasons, we conclude that the District Judge did not abuse his discretion in 
denying the motion to disqualify and that Mitan has not shown a clear an indisputable right to a 
writ of mandamus.
5
  We will therefore deny the mandamus petition.  
                                              
5
 Mitan generally asserts that recusal is warranted under 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(5)(iv) without 
identifying how the District Judge would be a material witness in the § 2255 proceedings.  He 
has therefore failed to show a clear and indisputable right to relief on this basis.  
